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REFORMING THE FEDERAL RELATIONSHIP
TO EDUCATIONAL ACCREDITATION
MATTHEW

W.

FINKINt

In seeking to assist students and institutions of higher education,

the federal government faced a conundrum. On the one hand, government sought the assurance that its funds were serving the purposes in-

tended, that is, that tax monies would not be paying for substandard
education. But, on the other, government also desired to eschew any
control of education. How can government determine that the educa-

tional offerings of the institutions assisted (directly or indirectly) meet
at least minimum qualitative standards without itself setting those

standards? The solution, chosen first in 1952 and relied upon in much
of the subsequent legislation,' appeared to be simplicity itself: govern-

ment would be assured of institutional or programmatic quality merely
by relying upon the decisions of private accrediting agencies whose determinations are widely recognized in the academic community as be-

ing sufficiently reliable for this purpose; the Commission of Education
was accordingly directed simply to list such agencies.

During the past decade, however, private accreditation, and the
propriety of federal reliance upon it, has come in for substantial criticism.' At the same time, and as the amount of public monies involved
has come to exceed five billion dollars,3 the Office of Education has

expanded its role vis-h-vis accrediting agencies until it has begun to
t Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University; A.B. 1963, Ohio Wesleyan University;
LL.B. 1967, New York University; LL.M. 1973, Yale University. Parts I and II of this article are a
revised and expanded version of a report prepared for the Council on Postsecondary Accreditation. The author wishes to express his appreciation to Dr. Charles M. Chambers of the Council's
staff for his assistance and comments. The opihions expressed are entirely the author's and do not
represent the views of the Council, its constituents or staff.
1. See text accompanying notes 5-26 infra.
2. See generally C. WARD, THE STATE OF ACCREDITATION AND EVALUATION OF POSTSECONDARY OCCUPATIONAL EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES (1970); U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH,
EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, REPORT ON LICENSURE AND RELATED HEALTH PERSONNEL
CREDENTIALING (1971); U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, REPORT ON

HIGHER EDUCATION (1971); H. Orlans, N. Levin, E. Bauer & G. Arnstein, Private Accreditation
and Public Eligibility (February 1974) (report prepared for U.S. Office of Education under contract with Brookings Institution and National Academy of Public Administration Foundation)
(permission to use granted to author) [hereinafter cited as H. Orlans].
3. The figure is taken from F. DICKEY & J. MILLER, A CURRENT PERSPECTIVE ON ACCREDITATIONS 34 (1972). Considerably more money is doubtless involved today.
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proximate that of a regulator of accreditation.4 Much of the criticism,
and all of the administrative response, has simply assumed that Congress has given the Office of Education broad authority to fashion
standards governing the selection of those accrediting agencies it will
rely upon, so long as the standards adopted comport with current notions of how the public interest is best served. Almost unassessed in the
debate is the validity of that assumption.
Consequently, the determination of the proper scope of administrative discretion under the existing statutory scheme is an essential
predicate to analysis; only by first deciding what the government's statutory role in accreditation is can one begin to consider alternatives for
what it ought to be. In addition, this threshold determination supplies
a much-needed institutional focus. To conclude, as this discussion will,
that the scope of administrative discretion is considerably narrower
than many critics and government officials have heretofore assumed, is
also to conclude that many of the proposals for change have been directed to the wrong branch of government.
Accordingly, this discussion first addresses the threshold question
of the scope of administrative authority Congress has actually conferred upon the Commissioner of Education in the listing of accrediting
agencies. It will next survey alternatives for reform and, to the extent
criticism of the current system appears to be well founded, will propose
reforms attuned to the statutory purpose.
I.

THE ACCREDITATION-RELIANCE SYSTEM

A. Establishingthe Model- 1952-1968
The model for the system of federal reliance upon private accreditation was established in 1952 by the Korean War GI Bill.5 Congress
was concerned about "fly-by-night" schools and "blind alley" programs. State approval had, in many instances, been no more than a
rubber stamp. A role for the Office of Education was proposed and, to
4. "The Office [of Education] has come increasingly to exercise with respect to accrediting
agencies a regulatory function comparable in substance if not in form to that of other government
regulatory bodies." H. Orlans, supra note 2, at 98. The Office of Education official primarily
responsible for the management of the accreditation-reliance system has described his division's
function as "quasi-regulatory." Memorandum from John R. Proffitt, Director, Division of Eligibility and Agency Evaluation, to John Ellis, Executive Deputy Commissioner for Educational
Programs, Office of Education (June 3, 1977) (copy on file in office of North Carolina Law
Review).
5. Veterans' Readjustment Assistance Act of 1952, ch. 875, 66 Stat. 663 (repealed 1958).
The legislative history is discussed more fully in Finkin, FederalRelianceon oluntaryAccreditation: The Power to Recognize as the Power to .Regulate,2 J.L. & EDuc. 339, 343-46 (1973).
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some extent, contested by the Veterans' Administration. As part of the
resulting compromise, state approval agencies were authorized to approve courses offered by an institution that had been accredited "by a
nationally recognized accrediting agency or association," and, as a facility for state approval agencies, the Commissioner of Education was
authorized to list such accrediting agencies: "For the purposes of this
title, the Commissioner [of Education] shall publish a list of nationally
recognized accrediting agencies and associations which he determines
to be reliable authority as to the quality of training offered by an educational institution .

"..
6

This solution rested upon three closely related assumptions. First,
the statute assumed that "nationally recognized accrediting agencies"
existed and were of sufficient reliability that state government could
permissibly piggyback its own approval of courses upon the private
agency's decisionmaking processes. Second, reliance upon private determinations of educational quality would obviate the threat of federal
control of education. Third, the role of the Commissioner of Education
in determining that such nationally recognized agencies were of sufficient reliability would be essentially ministerial. The last assumption,
reflected both in language that merely directs the Commissioner to
publish a list and in the legislative history,7 is a necessary corollary of
the other two; it would be anomalous for the government to avoid the
direct regulation of educational institutions by regulating the substantive standards of accrediting agencies, thereby doing indirectly what
the statute was intended to avoid.
The ministerial character of the Commissioner's role is reflected as
well in the agency's contemporary interpretation of the statute, which
builds upon the statutory directive that the Commissioner determine
whether or not an accrediting agency is nationally recognized as a reliable authority. Following enactment, the Commissioner consulted an
"advisory group of educators" who were largely drawn from the accrediting community.' The resulting criteria for listing by the Commissioner as a nationally recognized accrediting agency accepted current
6. Ch. 875, § 253, 66 Stat. 663 (1952) (repealed 1958).
7. The bill proposed by the House Committee on Veterans' Affairs contained a directive to
the Administrator of Veterans' Affairs to publish a list of accrediting agencies in language identical to that ultimately adopted. The Committee accepted the substitution of the Commissioner of
Education for the Veterans' Administration. The Committee emphasized that the "contemplated
function of the Office of Education is of a professional character only." H.R. REP. No. 1943, 82d
Cong., 2d Sess. 35 (1952).
8. 17 Fed. Reg. 8,929 (1952).
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accrediting practices, particularly of the regional associations. Of
significance was the requirement that the agency must have "gained
acceptance of its criteria, methods of evaluation, and decisions, by educational institutions, practitioners, licensing bodies and employers
throughout the United States."9 Similarly, an agency that had been in
existence for less than two years was required to demonstrate "to the
satisfaction of the Commissioner. . . that it has gained the acceptance
required" during the shorter period.' 0
The publication of the criteria was accompanied by the initial
Commissioner's list, which included the six regional associations and
twenty-one specialized agencies. Provision was made for additions to
the list. In contrast to the adoption of the initial list, however, it was
contemplated that additions to the list would be made at the request of
accrediting agencies that desired to be so listed. The relationship between the Office of Education and accrediting agencies established by
this provision would loom large in the Commissioner's view of his authority twenty years later.
In ensuing measures such as the National Defense Education Act
of 1958," the Nurse Training Act of 1964,12 and the Higher Education
Act of 1965,1 3 the language of the 1952 Act was looked to, in essence, as
"boilerplate,"' 4 albeit with occasional modifications that most often allowed some unaccredited schools to be eligible for participation if their
credits would be considered transferable by accredited schools or if
there was reasonable assurance that they would achieve accreditation.
In the Higher Education Facilities Act of 196311 and the State Technical Services Act of 1965,16 the Commissioner was authorized in certain
instances to engage in direct accreditation upon a finding that there was
no reliable nationally recognized accrediting agency suitable for the
purposes of those Acts. On balance, the legislative history of these and
related measures indicate continued general congressional acceptance
of the assumptions upon which the system of federal reliance on private
9. Id. at 8,930.
10. Id.
11. Pub. L. No. 85-864, § 101, 72 Stat. 1581 (codified in scattered sections of 20, 42 U.S.C.).
12. Pub. L. No. 88-581, 78 Stat. 908 (codified in scattered sections of 33, 42 U.S.C.).
13. Pub. L. No. 89-329, 79 Stat. 1219 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 1001-1150
(West 1976 & Cum. Supp. 1978)).
14. H. Orlans, supra note 2, at 106-07. Orlans suggests, however, that reliance upon the
model of the 1952 Act was also the product of lobbying and political choice. Id. at 107-08.
15. Pub. L. No. 88-204, § 42, 77 Stat. 363 (current version codified in scattered sections of 20

U.S.C.).
16. Pub. L. No. 80-182, § 1, 79 Stat. 679 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1351 (1976)).
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17
accreditation was built.

That reliance was placed in question in the period from 1965 to
1968 when a struggle took place for control of nurse training accreditation. These developments shed further light on the Commissioner's authority and the institutional roles of Congress and the Office of
Education in setting accreditation policy. The Nurse Training Act of
1964 extended to all categories of nurse training institutions. The Act
required that they be accredited by a body or bodies approved for this
purpose by the Commissioner, but permitted approval by the Commissioner if he found, after consultation with the appropriate accrediting
agency or agencies, that there was reasonable assurance that the program would meet accreditation standards. The Commissioner had approved the National League for Nursing (NLN) as the sole agency for
nurse training accreditation. The American Association of Junior Colleges had been especially critical of the requirement of programmatic
nurse training accreditation in addition to the institutional accreditation carried on by the regional associations, and special note was made
that few junior college programs had been either accredited or given
reasonable assurance of accreditation by the NLN.' 8 The Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare proposed that the Commissioner
be given direct accreditation authority.' 9 The wisdom of this proposal
was questioned by HEW. Under-Secretary Cohen pointed out that regional and state accreditation applied to the institution as a whole and
would not necessarily attest to the quality of a nurse training program.
Moreover, he considered the proposed authority unnecessary because
under existing law there is no restriction on the accrediting body or

bodies which the Commissioner of Education may recognize for the
purposes of this act. If he should find, therefore, that accrediting
bodies other than the National League for Nursing have developed
accrediting or approval programs that give attention to the quality of
nurse education programs in colleges or junior colleges he could recognize these additional bodies for accreditation purposes.20

Nevertheless, Congress did grant accreditation authority to* the
Commissioner. 2 '
17. See generally Finkin, supra note 5, at 348-61.
18. See generally H.R. REP. No. 781, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 20, reprintedin [1965] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 3766, 3773.

19. S. REP. No. 1378, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 16-17 (1964).
20. Finkin, supra note 5, at 364 n.173.
21. Health Professions Educational Assistance Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 80-290,
§ 5(b), 79 Stat. 1052 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. § 298b(6) (West Cum. Supp. 1977)).
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In 1967 an unsuccessful effort was made to delete the Commissioner's authority to engage in direct accreditation. The House Committee's report observed:
In general, this method of determining eligibility of institutions and
programs for Federal assistance has worked extremely well; however,
it must be recognized that as a practical matter the requirement that
an institution or program be accredited by a private nongovernmental group to qualify for assistance permits the private nongovernmental group to be in a position to determine, in accordance with its own
standards and procedures, eligibility of other groups or institutions to
receive Federal aid, and thereby to a degree constitutes a delegation
of legislative power to a private organization. 2 2
The effort to delete the Commissioner's authority was renewed in
1968. The administration stressed that it had not used the power given
it "because of our deep reservations about this kind of Federal involvement in education."2 3 The House Committee again addressed the
issue:
As this committee pointed out in its report . . . last year, the
provisions of existing law permitting a private organization to determine, in accordance with its own standards, eligibility of other
institutions to receive Federal funds, constitutes a delegation of legislative power by the Congress to a single private organization. The
committee feels that additional organizations should be designated as
accredited bodies for purposes of the act, and has amended the bill
correspondingly.2 4
As a result, the committee opted for a deletion of direct accreditation
authority, coupled with an expansion of agencies that could be relied
upon by including state and regional, that is, institutional, accreditation
in addition to specialized, program accreditation. As the House Committee explained:
The Commissioner would be required to publish a list of nationally
recognized accrediting bodies, and State agencies, which he determines to be reliable authority as to the quality of training offered.
The committee expects that this list will include the National League
for Nursing, the Joint Commission on the Accreditation of Hospitals
and the appropriate regional educational agencies that are nationally
22. H.R. REP. No. 538, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 34 (1967).
23. Health Manpower Act: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Health of the Senate Comm. on
Labor and Public Welfare, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 82-83 (1968) (statement of Dr. Phillip R. Lee,
Assistant Secretary for Health and Scientific Affairs, U.S. Dep't of Health, Education, and

Welfare).
24. H.R. REP. No. 1634, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 36, reprintedin [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 3379, 3399.

19791

E UCA TIONAL A CCREDITATION

recognized as accreditation authorities. 25
Two aspects of this episode are instructive. First, the problem
arose because the standards of the single, specialized agency relied
upon by the Commissioner were seemingly too high to assure the production of the number of professionals that the Congress thought necessary. Second, the House reports evidence congressional awareness
that federal reliance upon a private accrediting agency meant, as a
practical matter, that the agency would be exercising public power.
Significantly, the alternative chosen to deal with the problem was to
increase the number of alternative agencies that could be relied upon,
rather than to continue the system of direct federal accreditation
(which had never actually been used) or to authorize administrative
controls over the private agency. In fact, in the Allied Health Professions Personnel Training Act of 1966,26 Congress expanded the definition of a "training center for allied health professions" expressly to
include divisions within regionally accredited junior colleges, thereby
delegating accreditation authority directly to the regional associations,
obviating any listing (or review) by the Commissioner for the purposes
of the Act. That Act and the legislative confrontation with nurse training accreditation supplies a useful datum for scrutiny of the Commissioner's authority under related statutes.
B. "The Era of Quasi-Regulation'"27 1968 to Present
In 1968 the Office of Education established a special staff on accreditation and institutional eligibility and an Advisory Committee to
review and recommend policy and to review and recommend accrediting agencies under the Commissioner's criteria for listing. As a major
study observed, this "action was a response to the mounting administrative and policy problems resulting from the repeated statutory use of
accreditation and, most immediately, from the extension of vocational
loans to students at accredited proprietary schools. It was not a response to any direct legislative injunction."2 In 1969 the Commissioner adopted the first revision in the 1952 criteria.29 The revision
expanded upon the procedures that accrediting agencies must employ.
It also provided for periodic reevaluation of accrediting agencies, by the
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Id.
Pub. L. No. 89-751, 80 Stat. 1222 (codified in scattered sections of 12, 42 U.S.C.).
The phrase is Orlans'. H. Orlans, supra note 2, at 133.
Id.
34 Fed. Reg. 643 (1969).
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Commissioner at least once every four years. However, in sharp contrast to Secretary Cohen's observation that nothing prohibited the
Commissioner from listing all accreditation agencies that otherwise met
statutory standards, and in further contrast to the legislative struggle of
the previous year over nurse training accreditation, the Office of Education took the position that "it is unlikely that more than one association or agency will qualify for recognition" either for a defined
geographic area or in a given field or program. Moreover, in order to
be listed the agency would be required to demonstrate "its capacity and
willingness to enforce ethical practices among the institutions, and educational programs accredited by it."30
In 1974 the Commissioner adopted a second revision that expanded the scope of the criteria even more. 31 Procedurally, the criteria
stressed far more than the 1952 and 1969 criteria that accrediting agencies were to be considered as applicants for listing and renewal. Further, it continued to expand the procedures that approved agencies
must employ in the accrediting process.
Four areas of additional regulation, however, cannot be viewed
simply as extensions of procedure. First, the criteria expanded the requirement that the agency "foster ethical practices" by including under
that head "equitable student tuition refunds and nondiscriminatory
practices in admissions and employment." Second, it required the
agency to encourage "experimental and innovative programs." Third,
it required that the agency take "into account the rights, responsibilities, and interests of students, the general public, the academic, professional, or occupational fields involved, and institutions." Finally, and
apparently to the end envisioned by that requirement, the accrediting
agency was required both to include "representatives of the public" in
its decisionmaking processes and to assure that the composition of its
policy and decisionmaking bodies reflects the community of interests
directly affected by the scope of its accreditation.32
These revisions express a fundamental lack of confidence that accrediting agencies adequately function to protect the public interest.
They are premised upon the perceived need to make listed accrediting
agencies more responsive to the demands of consumer protection, the
need for educational change, and the observance of ethical institutional
practices, both directly, by so providing in the recognition criteria, and
30. Id. at 644.
31. 39 Fed. Reg. 30,042 (1974).
32. Id. at 30,043.
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indirectly, by changing the composition of the governing bodies of
listed accrediting agencies. As the responsible official within the Office
of Education wrote of the 1969 revision, the modifications in criteria
reflect "a concern that a recognized accrediting agency shall manifest
an awareness of its responsibility to the public interest, as opposed to
parochial education or professional interest" of the accredited constituency.3 3 Similarly, he observed of the 1974 revision that "the Commissioner's Criteria for Recognition has served as a stimulus for
progressive and responsible change on the part of accrediting
agencies."'
The ensuing section will analyze whether these modifications of
the Commissioner's criteria are consistent with the authority delegated
by Congress. Before reaching that question, it is important to ascertain
whether any congressional action during the "era of quasi-regulation"
can be understood as broadening the Commissioner's authority or as
altering the statutory bases for federal reliance upon private
accreditation.
Unlike the legislative histories of much of the earlier legislation
that, save for the dispute about nurse training, dealt little, if at all, with
the accreditation system, congressional attention was drawn extensively
to asserted deficiencies in the accreditation-reliance system in hearings
dealing explicitly with accreditation, and especially in connection with
abuses of the guaranteed student loan program." The congressional
response in the Education Amendments of 197236 was to give the Commissioner authority to prescribe regulations to provide for a "fiscal audit" of the institutions participating in the insured student loan
program, to establish "reasonable standards of financial responsibility"
for the institutions, and to suspend or terminate the eligibility of institutions that fall afbul of the regulations.3 7 This power was expanded
33. Address by John R. Proffitt, The U.S. Office of Education, Accreditation and the Public
Interest, Meeting sponsored by United States Office of Education and National Commission on
Accrediting (November 6, 1970), quoted in Finkin, sura note 5, at 369.
34. Address by John R. Proffitt, Accreditation and the Federal Government or The Federal
Connection, Conference of Academic Deans of Southern States (December 14, 1976) (copy on file
in office of North CarolinaLaw Review).
35. See,4ccreditationofPostsecondaryEducationalnstitutionsHearingsBefore the Subcomm.
on Education of the Senate Comm. on Labor andPubic Welfare, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974); Guaranteed Student Loan Program:Hearings Before the PermanentSubcomm. on Investigationsof the
Senate Comm on Government Operations,94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
36. Pub. L. No. 92-318, 86 Stat. 235 (codified in scattered sections of 7, 12, 16, 20, 29, 42

U.S.C.).
37. Id. § 132E (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C.A. § 1087-1 (West 1978)).
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by the Education Amendments of 197638 to include all aid programs
authorized under title IV." Moreover, the latter enactment required
institutions to carry out a program of dissemination of specified information to current and prospective students. The Commissioner was
given additional power to suspend or terminate the eligibility of an institution for substantial misrepresentation of the nature of its educational programs, its financial charges, or the employability of its
graduates.
The impetus behind these legislative efforts was the widespread
abuse of the guaranteed student loan program. A report of the House
Committee on Government Operations in 1974 concluded that the accreditation-reliance system was inadequate as a check upon abuses of
the program. It noted:
Government reliance on accreditation ... has extended well

beyond the area of educational quality. The accreditors have responded to complaints from Government agencies regarding advertising, business practices, refunds, and other alleged wrongdoing
.... While they have cooperated, and state that they desire to con-

tinue doing so, the accrediting associations also say that they are not
40
Government regulatory agencies, and should not be used as such.
The Senate Committee on Government Operations held hearings
on the Guaranteed Student Loan Program in December 1975. Its suggestions were communicated to the Senate Committee on Labor and
Public Welfare, then considering the Education Amendments of 1976,
by letter of Senators Nunn and Percy. They indicated that the "accreditation process" presented one problem among a number of others that
"could be corrected by new or revised regulations or administrative
procedures" and recommended that the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare "might want to consider including in pertinent legislation a
that HEW promulgate regulations in these and other specified
directive
41
areas."
Shortly before the Labor and Public Welfare Committee received
this recommendation, the administration's bill was introduced. With
38. Pub. L. No. 94-482, 90 Stat. 2081 (codified in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.). See also
H.R. CONF. REP. No. 94-1701, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 77, reprintedin [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. &

AD. NEWs 4877, 4903.
39. Pub. L. No. 94-482, §§ 131, 133, 90 Stat. 2081 (1976) (codified in scattered sections of 20

U.S.C.).
40. H.R. REP. No. 93-1649, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 31 (1974).
41. S. REP. No. 94-882, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 24, reprintedin [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 4713, 4736.
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respect to accreditation, it would have given the Commissioner's Advisory Committee statutory status and would have altered the Commissioner's authority to list accrediting agencies by requiring the
Commissioner to determine not only that they are a reliable indicator
of educational quality, but also that they are a reliable authority concerning "the probity" of the institution.4 2 The Senate Committee on
Labor and Public Welfare reacted to both proposals:
One item of particular interest among the Government Operations
Committee recommendations was their discussion of the relationship
between private accrediting associations and eligibility for Federal
student assistance programs. The Committee [on Labor and Public
Welfare] in recent years has held several hearings regarding this critical area. In strengthening the existing Title IV, the Committee took
no direct action affecting the existing and historically developed relationship between the U.S. Commissioner of Education and accrediting associations. An Administration proposal for statutory changes
in this area was presented to the Committee at such a late date that
realistic consideration was impossible. . . . The Committee is willing at an appropriate future time to review this important matter of
accreditation and eligibility and consider legislative improvements.4 3
Thus the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare rejected
the Commissioner's effort to secure express statutory authorization to
require accrediting agencies to determine the "probity" of the institutions they accredit as a condition for being listed; the Committee
thought this addition a novel departure from the existing and historically developed statutory scheme, requiring less hasty legislative consideration. Accordingly, neither the House Committee's 1974 report
nor the Senate Committee's 1976 report can be read as endorsing the
Commissioner's view of his authority under then-existing law. In contradistinction to the authority that the Commissioners sought, the 1972
and 1976 enactments increased regulatory power only in areas in which
particular abuses were perceived, by diiect delegation to government
officials, and eschewed any alteration in the existing statutory authority
of the Commissioner with respect to the accreditation system. From
this perspective it is clear that nothing in the legislation enacted after
1968 represents any change in the basic statutory assumptions of the
42. H.R. 11939, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) (introduced Feb. 21, 1976, 122 CONG. REC. 3682
(1976)).
43. S. REP. No. 94-882, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 26, reprintedin [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 4713, 4737.
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accreditation-reliance system. On the contrary, the post-1968 legislation indicates that when Congress sought to tighten controls over institutional activity, unrelated to educational quality, to effect policies of
consumer protection or financial responsibility, it chose to act directly
by means unrelated to the system of institutional or programmatic
accreditation.
II.

THE COMMISSIONER'S CRITERIA AND THE SCOPE OF
ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION

A. Substantive Requirements
The system of federal reliance upon private accreditation is premised upon the assumption that accrediting agencies exist and are sufficiently reliable indicators of educational quality that it is legally
permissible for government to depend upon their determinations as a
factor in the dispensation of public monies.' The Commissioner of
Education, however, has adopted three substantive criteria for the listing of accrediting agencies that, at the threshold, would seem to be inconsistent with that assumption: the requirement of public membership
in the agency's governing body, the requirement that the agency police
institutional observance of ethical practices, including, specifically, discrimination in employment and admissions, and the requirement the
agency encourage educational innovation.45 Whereas these modifications are premised upon a concern that private accrediting agencies become more attuned to the "public interest, as opposed to parochial...
interest," 46 and that the Commissioner's criteria serve as a stimulus for
progressive and responsible change, the statutes that authorize the publication of a list of accrediting agencies are premised upon the assumption, akin to the Invisible Hand, that when accrediting agencies act in
44. A memorandum from the Office of General Counsel, HEW, relied upon this factor in
concluding that the accreditation-reliance system did not constitute an impermissible delegation
of public power to a private group.
[PIrivate agencies undertake to accredit schools for many reasons other than Federal aid
eligibility. Accreditation is generally considered to be the single most reliable indicator
of institutional quality in higher education, and private accrediting agencies play a broad
The Federal-aid statutes merely take cognizance of this well-established system.
role ....
Office of General Counsel, U.S. Dep't of Health, Education, and Welfare, Working Paper on
Congress' Power to Rely upon Determination of Private Accrediting Agencies as Basis of Eligibility for Federal Educational Assistance (June 1970) (emphasis added) (copy on file in office of
North Carolina Law Review).
45. Orlans did not fully endorse this view. H. Orlans, supra note 2, at 133-34. The report
was, however, either critical of the wisdom or cynical about the effectiveness of these policies. Id.
at 158-212.
46. Address by John R. Proffitt, supra note 33, quoted in Finkin, supra note 5, at 369.
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their own narrow parochial interests, their determinations are sufficiently reliable for the government to accept; thus, nothing in the statutory authority for the Commissioner's list would appear to authorize
him to require that otherwise reliable agencies alter their policies to
47
achieve what the Commissioner deems to be progressive social policy.
Nevertheless, the responsible official within the Office of Education has offered several justifications for these substantive requirements; thus, the question is whether, as a matter of administrative law,
the reasons supporting the expansion of the Commissioner's authority
should be considered sufficiently persuasive to rebut what would otherwise appear to be a prima facie instance of administrative action ultra
vires the enabling legislation.
First, it is argued that
accrediting bodies are performing an increasingly important societal
role-a role in service to the broader society rather than one solely in
service of the narrower educational community. And if the Federal
Government is going to be justified in continuing strong reliance
upon private accreditation, the accrediting associations will need to
more explicitly
recognize their obligation to protect the public
48
interest.
The argument is premised upon the assumption that there is residual
authority under existing statutes to revise the Commissioner's criteria
in order to secure conformity with evolving notions of what best serves
the public interest. By this reasoning, the failure of the administration's 1976 legislative proposal to expand the Commissioner's statutory
power would not necessarily foreclose the Commissioner's fuller exercise of authority he possesses under existing law. Supporters of this
position would be expected to look to the decision of the United States
Supreme Court in UnitedStates v. Southwestern Cable Co. ,4 which affirmed the Federal Communications Commission's assumption of jurisdiction over CATV, despite the FCC's previously expressed doubt
that it had jurisdiction and the failure of legislative efforts expressly to
give it such jurisdiction. Mr. Justice Harlan opined,
"[U]nderlying the whole [Communications Act] is recognition of the
rapidly fluctuating factors characteristic of the evolution of broadcasting and of the corresponding requirement that the administrative
47. Finkin, supra note 5, at 369-72.
48. Address of John R. Proffitt, supra note 33, quoted in Finkin, supra note 5, at 371.
49. 392 U.S. 157 (1968).
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process possess sufficient flexibility to adjust itself to these factors." 50
. . . Congress in 1943 acted in a field that was demonstrably "both

new and dynamic," and it therefore gave the Commission "a comprehensive mandate," with "not niggardly but expansive powers."'"
The analogy to Southwestern Cable is analytically useful, for, upon
examination, the decision explains why the Office of Education's argument fails. As Louis Jaffe noted, the FCC was "created at least in the
image of the 'regulatory' agency. It has been given the trappings of
In contradistinction to the FCC, the Office of Edu,.52
authority .
cation has not been given a "comprehensive mandate" with "expansive
powers." On the contrary, when the subject of regulation impinges
upon the determination of standards of educational quality, a subject
traditionally shielded from federal regulation, 53 a clearer expression of
can
congressional intent should be required before ministerial language
54
be converted by administrative act into a regulatory mandate.
The ministerial nature of the Commissioner's role is illustrated by
contrasting the language authorizing the publication of a list of nationally recognized accrediting agencies with the direct designation of the
regional associations as determinants of federal eligibility in the Allied
Health Professions Personnel Training Act, and with other statutes that
rely without more upon the fact of accreditation. Because there is no
governmental review of the regional associations under the Allied
Health Professions Personnel Training Act to assure conformity with
the public interest, the question would be presented whether that Act
contains an impermissible delegation of public power to a private
group. James 0. Freedman has explained that the United States
Supreme Court
50. Id. at 172-73 (quoting FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 138 (1940))

(footnote added).
51. Id. (quoting National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 219 (1943)).
52. Jaffe, The Illusion of the IdealAdminstration,86 HARV. L. REV. 1183, 1193 (1973).

53. The statutory prohibition upon federal control of education contained in 20 U.S.C.
§ 1232a (1976) is discussed in Oulahan, The Legal ImpllicationsofEvaluation andAccreditation,7
J.L. & EDUC. 193, 231-34 (1978).
54. It is helpful to compare Southwestern Cable with American Trucking Ass'ns v. United
States, 242 F. Supp. 597 (D.D.C. 1965), af'd,382 U.S. 373 (1966). The question was whether the

Interstate Commerce Commission had jurisdiction to determine standards of safety for railwayhighway crossings. In holding that the ICC lacked jurisdiction, despite the seemingly encompassing language of the Safety Appliance Act, the court noted the deletion of a provision that would
have expressly included such devices and stressed that the subject matter had traditionally been
regarded as a state matter, thus, the court required a clearer expression of congressional intent to

authorize an expansion of federal administrative authority into an area long regarded as a state
prerogative. Cf. National Cable Television Ass'n v. United States, 415 U.S. 336 (1974) (determin-

ing proper measure of fees imposed by FCC upon CATV systems pursuant to statute). See also
Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
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has proceeded on the sensible premise that delegations to private
parties are constitutional when they serve important public purposes
and give promise of adequately considering and protecting the interests of all those subject to regulation ...
For example, courts commonly have sustained delegations to
private parties in the form of statutes that attach public consequences
to decisions that the delegate has made or would be making in any
event for purposes quite independent of giving content to the
legislation. 5

The Allied Health Professions Personnel Training Act does not impermissibly delegate public power to a private group because, as Congress
has determined, the regional associations will continue to function
pretty much as they did before the system of federal reliance, and, as
Congress has concluded, when they so function they are reliable

enough determinants of educational quality to permit the government
so to rely. Similarly, a number of statutes administered by federal

agencies other than HEW (including at least one that antedates the Korean War GI Bill) require institutional or programmatic "accredita-

tion," but without reference to any explicit approval or review
authority by those agencies.

6

Instinct in such provisions, however, is

55. Freedman, Delegationofower andInstitutionalCompetence, 43 U. CHi. L. REv. 307, 333
(1976). See also Liebmann, Delegation to PrivatePartiesin American ConstitutionalLaw, 50 IND.
LJ. 650, 681-83 (1975) (treating educational accreditation statutes).
56. The National Science Foundation Act of 1950, ch. 171, 64 Stat. 149 (current version at 42
U.S.C.A. §§ 1862-1863, 1873 (West 1978)), allowed the Foundation to award fellowships for scientific study at accredited institutions. The Office of Education has made note of "third party" use
of the Commissioner's list. Accrediting Agency Evaluation Branch, Division of Eligibility and
Agency Evaluation, Analysis of the U.S. Office of Education's Role in Recognizing Accrediting
Agencies (January 15, 1978) (copy on file in office of North CarolinaLaw Review). The Office of
General Counsel, HEW, has pointed out that the Immigration and Nationality Act, governing
student visas, and the Housing Act, governing college housing, rely upon institutional accreditation. Office of General Counsel, U.S. Dep't of Health, Education, and Welfare, Responsibility
Conferred on U.S. Commissioner of Education to List Accrediting Agencies Under Statutory Provisions Related to Program Eligibility of Accredited Institutions (Jan. 20, 1978) (copy on file in
office of North CarolinaLaw Review). That list is not exhaustive; cursory research has revealed
several approaches. Some statutes, like the State Technical Services Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1351-1368
(1976) (which the General Counsel does note), or grants to graduate schools of social work under
42 U.S.C. § 908(d)(2) (1970), delegate to the Commissioner of Education the authority to publish
a list of accrediting agencies, employing the now customary boilerplate. On the other hand, for
the purposes of scholarship, grants and contracts to assist students in, and educational programs
of, water quality treatment, the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency is substituted for the Commissioner of Education in the familiar boilerplate. 33 U.S.C. § 1262(a)(1)
(1976). See also H.R. REP. No. 91-127, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 27-28, reprintedin [19701 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 2691, 2709. Similarly, the Secretary of the Interior is given authority to enter

into contracts for nursing education of American Indians with schools of nursing "accredited by a
body or bodies approved for such purpose by the Secretary [of the Interior]." 25 U.S.C. § 309
(1970). Other statutes simply rely upon the fact of "accreditation." See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 2014(c),
10 U.S.C. §§ 2102(a), 2120(3), 4314, 33 U.S.C. § 902(18)(B) (1976).
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the requirement that the agency administering the relevant act determine whether or not the institution or program is validly accredited;
thus, the administering agency must determine, for the purposes of
such an act, the reliability of the accrediting agency as a recognized
determinant of education quality. The express statutory authority of
the Commissioner of Education merely to publish a list of the agencies
does not differ qualitatively from these other enactments. Just as these
other federal agencies may not endeavor to alter the internal policies of
otherwise well-recognized agencies as a condition of reliance upon
them, neither may the Office of Education.
There is, to be sure, a related but more subtle argument for the
imposition of administrative controls; that is, that many of the accrediting agencies on which government now relies have come into existence
less in response to the antecedent demands of the academic community
than to government's need to rely upon them. Turning Freedman's
formulation around, it could be argued that because these novel agencies have come into existence only to give content to the federal
scheme, in the absence of regulation of their policies government simply lacks adequate assurance that they do in fact "give promise of adequately considering and protecting the interests of all those subject to
regulation."
Had this been the gravamen of the Commissioner's argument, it
would pose the truly fascinating question whether an administrative
act, which is otherwise ultra vires the unequivocal statutory scheme,
can be taken in order to save the legislation from constituting an impermissible delegation of public power to a private group. Congress was
fully aware that new agencies would arise to fill the need that the legislation created." Further, the determinations of these new agencies,
particularly those concerned with proprietary vocational training, may
be crucial to the institution's very existence. The resulting pressure
upon the agency to grant accreditation may compound the "cronyism"
of which accreditation in general has been accused.5" Nevertheless, the
legislation assumed that such agencies would be readily cast in the
mold of their more well-established counterparts.
57. See, e.g., HigherEducationAl of 1965: Hearingson S. 600 Before the Subcomnm on Education ofthe Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 89th Cong., Ist Sess. 1069 (1965) (statement of Walter J. Tribbey).
58. See Address by Roger W. Heyns, The Improvement of Self Regulation in Higher Education, COPA Conference on Accreditation (February 3, 1977) (copy on file in office of North Carolina Law Review). For a more polemical statement see Koerner, The CaseofMarjorie Webster, 20
PUB. INTEREST 40, 58-59 (1970).
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It suffices to say, however, that the Commissioner has not distinguished between established agencies, like the regional associations,
that raise no question of impermissible delegation, and novel agencies
that require greater supervision because of their suspicious, or less auspicious, origins. Nor could he. The Commissioner has sought to bring
all listed agencies into conformity with his policies; the foregoing argument would compel the Commissioner to concede that, at least to certain of the more well-established agencies, portions of his listing
criteria need not apply. Finally, and perhaps more important, this argument for greater administrative supervision flows from the suspicion
that some agencies, because of the critical role they perform in eligibility for federal program participation and so in institutional survival,
may be softening the rigor of their educational assessment. The criteria
at issue here deal with that question not at all.
In sum, it may well be that absent alterations in the composition of
their governing boards, greater interest in educational reform, and
greater sensitivity to the ethics of accredited institutions, existing accrediting agencies-no matter how much their judgments are recognized in the academic community as reliable indicators of educational
quality-are not serving adequately as ensurers of a larger public interest. But Congress has not delegated authority to the Office of Education to define that larger interest and assure conformity with it as a
condition of federal reliance. If the Commissioner is correct-if accrediting agencies should be reformed before they are relied upon by
government-then the reformation must be effected by the legislature.
A second justification offered by the Office of Education stresses
the voluntarism of the Commissioner's list. In refuting the existence of
any federal intrusion into the affairs of accrediting agencies, the director of the responsible agency stressed "the complete freedom of these
organizations [accrediting agencies] to resign from the Commissioner's
List."5 9 The unarticulated premise of this justification is that applicants
who voluntarily choose to apply for listing cannot complain of the
standards to which they must conform.
The threshold requirement of an application for listing is within
the scope of the Commissioner's discretion. Even though the enabling
59. Address by John R. Proffitt, supra note 34. See also Accrediting Agency Evaluation
Branch, Division of Eligibility and Agency Evaluation, Supra note 56, at 11 ("From the Office of
Education's perspective, application for listing ... by the Commissioner is entirely voluntary.
No agency has ever been recruited for listing by the Office.").
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statutes read as a directive to the Commissioner to list nationally recognized accrediting agencies, and can be read as a command to the Commissioner affirmatively to seek those agencies out, it is unlikely that the
Commissioner could successfully recruit an uncooperative agency.
Further, the Commissioner's contemporaneous reading of the 1952 Act
did provide that subsequent listing would be at the "request" of the
heretofore unlisted agency. Moreover, the courts have traditionally
given federal administrative agencies great leeway in procedural matters; it cannot be said that the adoption of an application procedure is
arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or ultra vires the authorizing statutes.
Nevertheless, the infirmity in this justification is that it uncouples
the Commissioner's criteria for listing from their statutory source; that
is, it assumes that because the relationship is voluntary, the Commissioner is free to adopt any condition of recognition that arguably serves
the public interest, unencumbered by limitations imposed by the statutes that authorize the publication of the Commissioner's list. Being
derived from statute, however, the Commissioner's authority cannot
rise higher than the statutory source. The question remains one of determining the permissible scope of administrative discretion, authorized by the relevant statutes, and on that question the voluntarism of
the listing procedures is simply irrelevant.
The final justification offered by the Office of Education does return to the statutory source. The Director of the responsible agency has
stated:
In order for accrediting agencies to merit the support and acceptance
of government, and of society as a whole, they must keep themselves
current with legitimate educational issues and trends. In this context,
I find that some accrediting agencies have been derelict during the
past several decades in not recognizing the socially-related character
of educational quality. Thus, in an era of accelerated societal
change, accrediting agencies often have found themselves cast in unduly conservative and obsolete postures. Two cases in point are the
tardiness of some accrediting associations . . . in accepting the factors of discrimination and institutional probity as components of the
educational quality equation. Concepts of quality must be expansive, rather than restrictive; fluid rather than static.60
60. Address by John R. Proffitt, supra note 34. The "finding" that accrediting agencies have
been "derelict during the past several decades" in failing to recognize the relationship of discrimination to educational quality is mildly surprising since the Commissioner did not discover the
relationship until 1974. It suffices to say, wholly apart from the misconstruction of the statutory
concept of educational quality, that the addition of yet another, albeit informal, mechanism to
remedy discrimination is not necessarily helpful. Cf. Meltzer, Labor Arbitration and Overlapping
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The infirmity in this argument is that the concept of educational
quality, as employed in the relevant statutes, is simply not an elastic,
"socially-related" one that would allow federal administrators to incorporate almost any factor they deemed socially progressive as part of the
criteria for listing by the Commissioner.6 As Mr. Justice Frankfurter
put it: "[L]aws are not abstract propositions. They are expressions of
policy arising out of specific situations and addressed to the attainment
of particular ends."' 62 The legislative end sought by reliance upon private accreditation was to assure that the instruction offered would meet
minimum content standards of educational quality without federal regulation of those standards. When institutions have abused federal programs or fallen short of perceived societal needs unrelated to the
quality of their educational offerings, such as the failure to afford better
protection of the student consumer, Congress has chosen to legislate
directly to correct those deficiencies rather than rely upon accrediting
agencies for that purpose. In sum, the administrator's expansive and
flexible definition of quality finds no statutory support and is inconsistent with the legislative scheme.
B.

ProceduralConsiderations

Much of the Office of Education's refinement of the procedural
standards that accrediting agencies must employ, while debatable in
terms of the wisdom of requiring inflexible uniformity on the part of all
accrediting agencies, cannot be said to be arbitrary or an abuse of administrative discretion. Similarly, the requirement of periodic reevaluation of listed agencies is well within the ambit of discretion. The
Office of Education, however, has not confined itself only to the listing
of those agencies whose activities can be shown to relate to eligibility
and Conflicting RemediesforEmployment Discrimination,39 U. Cml. L. REv. 30 (1971) (discussing
problems with overlapping remedies under grievance procedures and under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964).
61. Orlans states:
Finkin cites the requirement that an accrediting agency "enforce ethical standards" as
but it is
one which is irrelevant to a determination of educational quality, as indeed it is,
not irrelevant to the public acceptance of an agency as being a "reliable" authority since
one can hardly be reliable without being honest.
H. Orlans, supra note 2, at 134 (emphasis added). The ethical practices criterion does not require
that the accrediting agency be ethical-surely a necessary aspect of reliability-but that it under-

take a new policing function vis-h-vis accredited institutions. The Commissioner could require
such an undertaking only if the observance of ethical practices by institutions is a necessary aspect

of educational quality, which, Orlans agrees, it is not.
62. Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REv. 527, 533
(1947).
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for specific federal programs. Because the statutory authority to list
accrediting agencies is not a delegation to the Commissioner of Education to list accrediting agencies in general, but only those that will serve
as an adequate determinant of educational quality for the purposes of
particular legislative programs, an argument has been made that the
Commissioner's failure to limit the list only to those agencies that serve
a function under an identifiable federal program exceeds the discretion
conferred by the authorizing legislation.6 3
Five considerations have been offered in rebuttal. 64 First, it has
been argued that, given the especial amorphousness of the GI Bill, the
Office of Education simply cannot know the nature of each and every
program for which accreditation could be relied upon by an appropriate state agency, and that, in effect, the Commissioner's list includes
only accrediting agencies that do, at least potentially, perform a function in determining eligibility for some federal program.6 5 Second, it is
not always clear whether a particular statute contemplates program
(specialized) accreditation or institutional accreditation.6 6 Third, and
closely related,
As a consequence of the fact that the Commissioner's function
in recognizing accrediting agencies relates primarily to the question
of quality, we see no legal reason why he could not grant recognition
to a specialized accrediting agency even where the institution or its
students are otherwise able to participate in programs of Federal
financial assistance because the institution has been institutionally
accredited. . . . [A] probable nexus to Federal spending must be
shown, even if such nexus consists of increased assurance of the quality of training provided in that institution in relation to67eligibility to
receive federal funds by the institution or its students.
Fourth, the listing of accrediting agencies that seem to perform no precise function in determining eligibility dates from the original 1952 criteria and list; thus, the policy is sanctioned by contemporaneous and
63. Council on Postsecondary Education, A Brief Analysis of the U.S. Office of Education's
Role in Recognizing Accrediting Agencies (Dec. 2, 1977) (copy on file in office of North Carolina
Law Review).
64. The rebuttal is contained in Accrediting Agency Evaluation Branch, Division of Eligibility and Agency Evaluation, supra note 56. Supporting legal argument is supplied in a paper prepared by M. Conway, Office of the General Counsel, U.S. Dep't of Health, Education, and
Welfare, The Commissioner's Authority to List Accrediting Agencies and Associations: Necessity
for an Eligibility Issue (May 25, 1978) (copy on file in office of North CarolinaLaw Review).
65. M. Conway, supra note 64, at 5-8.
66. Id. at 10.
67. Id. at 15-16.
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long-standing administrative practice.6" Finally, the Commissioner's
list is looked to as a matter of practice or policy by other federal agencies that administer statutes that rely upon the fact of accreditation; the
listing of accrediting agencies that may be unrelated to statutes that
authorize the Commissioner to prepare a list of agencies is simply a
service of the Office of Education to those other agencies. The Office of
Education need not secure express statutory authorization to perform
such a service for these other federal agencies, less expert in educational matters and less experienced with the vagaries of accreditation,
merely as an adjunct to the69listing function that the Office of Education
would otherwise perform.
The last argument is not entirely to the point. Even if other federal agencies rely upon the Commissioner's determinations for the purposes of their statutes, it does not follow that the Commissioner is
thereby free to list accrediting agencies at large, without a showing that
they perform a function under some statute. The argument concerning
improved quality is similarly troublesome. Regional accreditation attests to the quality of the institution as a whole, but not necessarily to
the quality of any one of its programs or offerings; thus, it is logically
possible for an institution to be regionally accredited while none of its
programs would withstand an objective evaluation of educational quality. Accordingly, this limb of the Office of Education's position is that
it is in keeping with the overall legislative purpose-improving educational quality by encouraging accieditation-for the Office of Education to list specialized agencies even though regional accreditation
would suffice for eligibility purposes. This argument, however, assumes that Congress legislated to encourage accreditation per se without reference to eligibility under any particular statute. Further,
assuming arguendo that some statutory references to accreditation are
unclear about whether specialized or institutional accreditation is intended, the Office of Education has made no effort to secure legislative
clarification or to indicate in the list itself what overlapping agencies
have been designated because of identifiable statutory uncertainty.
Nevertheless, the Commissioner's arguments to the furtherance of
overall educational quality and to contemporaneous, longstanding interpretation might be given deference to the extent the policy is simply
68. Accrediting Agency Evaluation Branch, Division of Eligibility and Agency Evaluation,
supra note 56, at 2.
69. Id. at 5-9.
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in aid of, and presents no fundamental inconsistency with, the legislative scheme. On the other hand, deference is less likely to the extent
the practical effects of the policy invade interests that Congress had not
intended to reach.
One effect of the Commissioner's indifference to whether a listed
agency actually serves as a determinant for eligibility for federal funds
concerns institutions. A claim by a listed accrediting agency to accredit
a particular school or program carries with it a tacit presumption that,
because the agency is listed, it does perform a function as a determinant not of educational quality at large but of eligibility with respect to
some federal funds; thus, institutional administrators faced with an accreditation request by a listed accrediting agency may give the agency
greater attention than would otherwise be deemed prudent or necessary. The result contributes both to the proliferation of accrediting
agencies and to the leverage they are able to assert. This is, of course,
precisely the consequence intended by the policy, that is, the improvement of educational quality at large by encouraging accreditation; but,
it is accomplished essentially by misleading the institutions.
In view of these implications and the clear wording of the authorizing statutes, the listing of agencies that perform no identifiable statutory function, without more, would appear to constitute an abuse of
discretion. The Commissioner could go far to salvage the policy, however, by mitigating these institutional consequences. The Commissioner could simply indicate in the published list which accrediting
agencies do actually serve as determinants of eligibility and under what
specific programs, and which are listed simply for their potential or
ancillary usefulness. This would dispel the uncertainty that confronts
institutional administrators faced with a claim by a listed accrediting
agency. In addition, a modification simply in the form of the list that
would maximize "consumer" information would be particularly fitting
for an agency whose expressed concern for almost a decade has been to
broaden consumer protection in education.
A second effect, however, concerns accrediting agencies and derives from the relationship of this policy to the closely related policy
adopted by the Office of Education in 1969 that, subject to exception,
limits the list to but a single accrediting agency for a given geographic
area, field, or program. The ostensible justification for this limitation is
the prevention of a proliferation of accrediting agencies. It is more
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than likely, however, that an accrediting agency with lower (but acceptable) standards would continue to be better subscribed than an overlapping agency with higher standards, even if both were listed by the
Commissioner. Thus the question here, as in the foregoing, is whether
this policy is simply in aid of the larger legislative purpose or invades
interests that Congress sought not to reach.
It is entirely uncertain whether this policy is actually in aid of the
legislative purpose at all. One argument in support of the Office of
Education's indifference to whether a listed agency actually fills a statutory need points to the listing function simply as a facility for other
federal programs. The Office of Education's role in performing this
service function does not logically require that it certify the soundness
of only one agency in each field. More troublesome is that many of the
relevant statutes speak in the plural of the agency or agencies, body or
bodies, that the Commissioner may list in conjunction with the particular federal program involved.7" Secretary Cohen observed of just such

a statute that no statutory limit had been placed upon the number of
accrediting agencies that might be listed; and, in the struggle over
nurse-training accreditation, Congress chose expressly to expand the
universe of accreditation agencies that might be relied upon. Accordingly, it remains to be seen whether, in light of statutes that expressly
contemplate a variety of accrediting agencies, the Commissioner is entirely free to adopt a blanket limitation to a single listing, in lieu of
making a particularized determination of the suitability of a limitation
to a single agency under a particular statute.
The bootstrap effect of this policy is underlined by the Commissioner's insistent reiteration of the argument that insofar as private
agencies are relied upon as determinants of federal eligibility they become delegates of the government and so shall be more closely supervised by government. Congress was acutely aware of the problems
posed by governmental reliance upon private agencies, as the House
reports over nurse training amply evidence. 7 Significantly, the alternative chosen was not to require greater supervision of an exclusive
70. For example, the Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. § 295(h) (1970), which authorizes
grants for certain graduate programs in health administration and planning, is just such an Act.
The regulations recently adopted speak directly to the issue in terms that parallel Secretary Cohen's earlier understanding: "[U]nder these regulations, if another body were given initial or expanded recognition by the Commissioner to include these areas, institutions with programs
accredited by such body would also become eligible for grants under this subpart." 43 Fed. Reg.
26,443 (1978).

71. See text accompanying notes 22-25 supra. The debate on accreditation and nurse training reflected this concern. "I do not know why the Government of the United States should
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franchisee, but to soften the effect of reliance by expanding the variety
of agencies that might be relied upon.
The significance of the generalized limitation to listing but a single
agency is magnified when it is coupled with the Commissioner's refusal
to tie listing to a showing that the accrediting agency performs an identifiable function under any statute. The practical result is that the
Commissioner of Education has become the dispenser of an exclusive
seal of approval-tantamount to a franchise 7 2 -upon accrediting agencies at large. Whether this combination of ingredients has contributed
to or dampened the proliferation of accrediting agencies is highly debatable;73 what it does accomplish is to provide a strong incentive for
accrediting agencies to seek listing by the Commissioner, which, in
turn, gives the Commissioner added leverage to induce accrediting
agencies to conform to social policies that the Commissioner deems desirable but that are otherwise ultra vires the statutory scheme.
III. A

PROPOSAL FOR REFORM

The need for reform in the existing system requires an assessment
of the criticism leveled against private accreditation, and so against federal reliance upon it. Essentially two very different objections have
been raised. The first, directed to the model of the preeminent specialized agency, views accreditation as an exercise of professional monopoly power, fostering the profession's special interest at the expense of
the larger public interest.74 The second, directed primarily to the regional associations of institutions (and, perhaps, to some of the newer
require a private group to spell out the standards ...

."

111 CONG. REc. 22461 (1965) (remarks

of Rep. Moss). "I do not think we ought to make these junior colleges go to a private organization-a private organization-to get their clearance before tax dollars are given to nursing schools
...Id. at 22462 (remarks of Rep. Rogers).
and students.
72. In a 1976 speech, the Director of the Office of Education's Division of Eligibility and
Agency Evaluation quoted with approval the following statement of the Office ofEducation's role:
"'[Tlhe government is exploring a new kind of role for itself- this is not the role of the accreditor
nor the regulator.... The role of government would seem to be to franchise the regulator by
setting standards and recognizing the private agency for its compliance with the standards.' "
Address by John R. Proffitt, supra note 34 (quoting address of Samuel P. Martin to the Commissioner's Advisory Committee (October 1975)).
73. Compare Accrediting Agency Evaluation Branch, Division of Eligibility and Agency
Evaluation, supra note 56, wi/h H. ORLANS, supra note 2, at 171-76.
74. See, e.g., Letter from Daniel C. Schwartz, Acting Director, Bureau of Competition, Federal Trade Commission, to Edward Aguire, U.S. Commissioner of Education (Nov. 11, 1976)
(urging delisting of Liaison Committee on Medical Education) (copy on file in office of North
CarolinaLaw Review); Statement of Daniel C. Schwartz Before the Advisory Committee on
Accreditation and Institutional Eligibility (March 24, 1977) (copy on file in office of North Carolina Law Review). See generally U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, REPORT
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vocationally oriented agencies), sees the major deficiency in the lack of
policing to assure consistent adherence to standards by currently accredited institutions or programs.75 As a leading study observed: "Accrediting agencies are not policing bodies. They make an overall
judgment about whether a school or programs [sic] meets the bulk of
the standards, and that is their major judgment. They do not monitor
and enforce obedience to all standards or the degree of compliance
with any single standard. '7 6 The problem, it seems, is that accrediting
agencies are either too powerful or too weak.
Assuming that government should be concerned about the quality
the
education supported by federal funds or received by students
of
receiving federal support,77 the obvious alternative is direct federal accreditation, either as a complete substitute for, or a supplement to, the
current system. The difficulties with this approach are killing, wholly
apart from the current climate of antagonism to increased federal regulation. Under such a system, the government would adopt standards of
educational quality governing the multitude of federal programs of student and institutional assistance, send out teams of government inspectors to ascertain conformity with the standards, and, most likely,
provide for agency review (and institutional challenge) of the inspectors' reports, subject, perhaps, to judicial review. Because thousands of
institutions and programs are involved, the task would be truly Herculean. More important, such a massive federal effort, entailing scrutiny
of curriculum, selection of instructional material, teaching methods,
and faculty quality, would engender significant first amendment questions. Finally, because every congressional district has at least one affected institution, and, often, a great many more, it remains to be seen
how a system of federal inspection could efficiently function, even assuming an adequate budget and a competent staff, in what would
doubtless be a charged political atmosphere.
The advantage of the current system lies, as Congress had intended, in the insulation of qualitative judgment from governmental
ON LICENSURE AND RELATED HEALTH PERSONNEL CREDENTIALING (1971); Newman, A Preview

ofthe SecondNewman Report, CHANGE, May 1972, at 28.
75. See, e.g., C. WARD, supra note 2.
76. H. Orlans, supra note 2, at 547.
77. The initial recommendation of the Newman Committee implied that eligibility should be
determined without regard to accreditation, and thus without regard to quality, so long as the
institution had disclosed an honest educational prospectus akin to an SEC submission. It nevertheless would have required a showing that the institution "conducts a program of some educational value for some clients," leaving the whole matter rather up in the air. These
recommendations are presented and criticized in H. Orlans, supra note 2, at 564-72.
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determination. To the extent reform is in order, the deficiencies of the
current system should be dealt with separately, as consistently as possible with the premises of the system. Congress, for example, has dealt
with institutional financial integrity and consumer information. The
administration of these enactments, unconcerned with educational
quality, is beyond the scope of the system of federal reliance upon accreditation, despite the Commissioner's efforts to goad or induce accrediting agencies to take on these issues. By the same token, it is
generally recognized that proprietary vocational institutions pose special problems. To the extent that deceptive trade practices by proprietary institutions are involved, the Federal Trade Commission has
assumed an active policing function; 78 the FTC's administration of that
statute is similarly beyond the scope of this discussion. Concern for
reform in the system of federal reliance upon private accreditation is
more narrowly and properly focused upon the question of their determination of educational quality.
A.

CorrectingAbuses of the Power to Accredit

One criticism, directed essentially to specialized accrediting agencies, considers their standards "too high" relative to some external standard of minimal acceptable educational quality. In effect, it is argued,
the profession is using its power over accreditation to enhance the bargaining power of the discipline vis-h-vis an institution's central administration or state government, to restrict the supply of professional
manpower by insisting upon artifically high standards, thereby increasing the economic return to graduates, or to impose a uniform, ideological straitjacket upon the content of professional training, thereby
discouraging desirable innovation.7 9 In all of these, by acting in its

own professional self-interest, it is argued that the powerful accrediting
agency's actions are adverse to the larger public interest.
One means of correcting these perceived abuses would be to have
the government pass upon the standards adopted by the agency to assure they are not being abused-for example, to see that they are not
78. See Oulahan, supra note 53, at 217-22.
79. See, e.g., Letter from Daniel C. Schwartz, supra note 74; Statement of Daniel C.

Schwartz, .pra note 74; Letter from Professors Clark C. Havighurst and Gaylord Cummins to
Ernest C. Boyer, U.S. Commissioner of Education (March 9, 1977) (urging delisting of Liaison
Committee on Medical Education) (copy on file in office of North CarolinaLaw Review).
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artificially high or ideologically narrow. The fatal defect in this approach is that it injects the government into the determination of educational standards measured not by acceptance in the academic
community, but by its own notions of what is educationally desirable;
this device would achieve indirectly what has long been thought government ought not do directly. Moreover, it remains to be seen why it
is necessarily inadvisable for government to rely upon the qualitative
judgments of a candidly elitist accrediting agency; high standards are
no less high for being perceived by some as artificially so.
An alternative, however, lies readily at hand. It has been argued
earlier that the Commissioner of Education lacks the power to adopt a
blanket limitation to listing a sole agency for a given geographic area or
specialty. Abandonment of that policy is not only compelled as a matter of administrative law, but would go far to dampen an exercise of
excessive power by specialized agencies. The opening of alternatives to
a particular agency would mean that, so long as the standards of an
alternative agency achieve sufficient acceptability in the academic and
professional community, there need not be a single, constricted model
of what a particular professional must know or how he must be educated. This seems to be the real goal of critics of the "excessive power"
school. Note, for example, the expected (and desired) consequences of.
delisting the Liaison Committee on Medical Education, the archetypal
"too powerful" accrediting agency:
It is quite likely that one or more organizations would step forward
with proposals and that one or more other private foundations would
welcome the chance to catalyze the formation of a new body...
the important function of
capable of performing in the public interest
80
accrediting the nation's medical schools.
There is no doubt that delisting would have had a catalytic effect,
and that something would have to be done to fill the vacuum. But the
cost of that action would be the assumption by the Commissioner of
Education of the power to pass upon the ideological purity of medical
accreditors as measured by his own notion of what is good medical
education.
On the other hand, the kind of private action contemplated could
be accomplished, if at a more stately pace simply because of the absence of the catalyst, but for the Commissioner's policy of listing only
one agency. There is no sound reason for such a restriction on competing models of what good professional education is. If a foundation
80. Letter from Professors Clark C. Havighurst and Gaylord Cummins, supra note 79.
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would welcome the chance to assist in the formation of an alternative
accrediting agency for medical education-one more concerned with
primary care and cost effectiveness and more attuned to the production
of physicians for prepaid group practice-there is no valid reason why
it should not fairly have a chance to have its model accepted by
schools, practitioners, hospitals, health maintenance organizations, and
the public. Once a sufficient degree of acceptance has been achieved,
there is no reason why such an entity should not be listed by the
Commissioner.
To be sure, a new entrant that has not yet achieved any national
recognition of the reliability of its determinations labors under a considerable handicap in establishing itself. That handicap, however, need
not be made insurmountable by the Commissioner. Given the universe
of schools, departments and programs, it is not at all inconceivable that
over time a new entrant could command enough support, even if only
as a respectable minority, to warrant listing by the Commissioner.
Even a moderate effort toward that end might result in a restructuring
of the incumbent or a modification in its policies to attend to the special
concerns of the competing organization. Alternatively, if an incumbent
chooses to adhere rigidly to its established view of professional education and the differences between the two are clear, then consumer
choice in the kind of professional education a student may select, and
the public's choice in the kind of professional service it receives, is increased. In fact, this effect of the abandonment of the exclusive listing
policy has consequences that transcend the powerful specialized
agency. As a leading study observed:
A weakness of regional accreditation is that it has, for most practical
purposes, stopped making quality distinctions. That will be denied,
but we believe it is true and even axiomatic, for how can distinctions
be drawn when all, or virtually all, eligible institutions are accredited? The accreditors' response that all accredited schools are of
minimal quality ... and yet constantly improving is too Panglossian

to be convincing. Even were it true, it would not help the public to
choose. Nothing would do more to revive the value of accreditation
to the public than a restoration of the classifications of institutional
quality or character which were widespread in its formative
years ....

A useful substitute ...

is the replacement of accrediting

monopolies by multiple accrediting in the same field or region, particularly8 if the standards and purposes of each agency are clearly
distinct. '
81. H. Orlans, supra note 2, at 556-57.
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A second problem of abuse of the power to accredit concerns both
institutions and accrediting agencies. Even with an expansion in the
menu of recognized agencies, a refusal to accredit or a disaccreditation
may have severe consequences to an institution's eligibility for federal
program participation. 82 Given the financial consequences of programmatic ineligibility, the institution labors under considerable pressure to
litigate upon the theory of a wrongful act by the accrediting agency.
Because most accrediting agencies are not especially well financed, the
mere threat of a significant volume of litigation may dampen the ardor
of an otherwise conscientious and perseverent accrediting agency to enforce its standards. Accordingly, it has been suggested that, insofar as
the determinations of the accrediting agency affect the institution's eligibility for federal funds, it would be appropriate for Congress to establish an agency to entertain appeals from schools or programs
concerning a refusal to accredit or a revocation of accreditation, when
the effect of denial or revocation is to render the institution ineligible
for federal program participation. 3 This proposal merits serious consideration. First, review of the accrediting agency's action would be
analogous to judicial review of administrative action under the Administrative Procedure Act; thus, the government would not be establishing
its own standards of educational quality but would be deciding, with
due deference to the accreditor's expertise and by reference to the universe of institutions or programs enjoying unchallenged accreditation,
whether the refusal or revocation was arbitrary, capricious or an abuse
82. The National Defense Education Act allowed an unaccredited institution to be eligible if
there was "satisfactory assurance" that the institution would ultimately be accredited or if the
credits of the institution "are accepted, on transfer, by not less than three (fully accredited) institutions." 20 U.S.C. § 403(b)(1976). The satisfactory assurance or "three letter" alternatives have
been adopted in some later legislation, notably for the purposes of eligibility for insured student
loans. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 1085 (1976). In 1965, apparently as a change in policy, the Office of
Education interpreted the three letter clause to mean that three accredited institutions have actually accepted transfer credit from an unaccredited college. Nevertheless, to the extent that accrediting agencies do assume an effective policing role, these alternatives to outright accreditation may
require some tightening.
83. GuaranteedStudent Loan Program:HearingsBefore the PermanentSubcomm. on Investigationsof the Senate Comrmn on Government Operations,94th Cong., 1st Sess. 374, 379 (1975) (joint
statement of Richard A. Fulton, Executive Director and General Counsel, and Dana R. Hart,
Executive Secretary, Aoerediting Commission of the Association of Independent Colleges and
Schools). They stressed that this procedure "would not be an alternative to eligibility. It would
merely be available oni, after the institution either had been denied accreditation or has been
stripped of it." Id. This aspect of the proposal varies sharply from that made 11 months before to
establish an alternative system of direct, federal accreditation. AccreditationofPostsecondaryEducational Institutions:HearingsBefore the Subcomna on Education of the Senate Comm on Labor
andPublic Welfare, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 278-79 (1974) (letter and draft legislation of Richard A.
Fulton).
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of discretion. In essence, the actions of the listed agency would be accorded presumptive soundness by the government, subject to review
upon notice and hearing in contested cases. Second, the availability of
such an appellate mechanism should reduce the threat of litigation and
so eliminate a barrier for vigorous and consistent administration of accrediting standards by the agencies themselves. Because the damages
sought in a lawsuit arising out of a refusal to accredit or a disaccreditation would turn, at least in part, upon the loss of federal program eligibility, and because such an appellate procedure would test precisely
whether the institution ought nevertheless to be eligible to participate,
one would expect the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedy
to come into play in such litigation. As a practical matter, affected institutions would have to pursue the appellate machinery. If successful,
their reputations would be vindicated and their eligibility for federal
participation secured. If unsuccessful, the prospect of securing judicial
vindication would be sufficiently remote that it would constitute no
more than a nuisance for accrediting agencies.
B. AssuringAdherence to Standards
By far the stronger and more serious criticism is that accrediting
agencies are woefully inadequate as policemen of their own standards.
Once accredited, an institution or program is subject to periodic reinspection at relatively long intervals. Given the current and projected
exigencies of institutional financing, enrollment, and the lack of growth
or actual retrenchment, such periodic reinspection may be too little, too
late in terms of attesting to educational quality in the interval. More
important, a great many accrediting agencies do not seriously undertake to reexamine the institution or program in the interval on the basis
of complaints of a significant departure from the agency's standards.
Some might attribute the relative toothlessness of accrediting agencies
to the manner in which they are composed.84 A leading study has been
84. A polemic on point puts it thus:
Normally regional accreditation is a rather quiet, clubby enterprise that seems to
have a special appeal for professional educators, small college presidents, and other sorts
of educational administrators. With their convoluted structure of committees and commissions and boards, the regionals operate in a manner that suggests mutual backscratching and logrolling, or what an uncharitable critic might call academic incest. The
same people are found serving year after year on one or another body, perhaps visiting

other people's institutions one year and in turn being visited by them the next, or serving
on a review group one year to carry out the policies of a higher body and serving on the
higher body the next.
Koerner, supra note 58, at 58.
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more sympathetic:
With few exceptions-the Liaison Committee on Medical Education
may be one . . .- accrediting agencies appear to be harassed and
frail operations, shoring up with earnest labor and heaps of paper an
edifice that can be firmly secured only with far more money and
widespread commitment than it has yet received. Accreditors may
believe deeply in what they are doing but many unto whom they do
it suggest that it is an unavoidable nuisance, and the less time and
money it costs, the better.85
The study concluded, nevertheless, that "educational standards are important; that better, stricter, and more carefully delineated, not fewer
and laxer standards are needed. We would criticize accrediting agen'86
cies not. . . for maintaining standards but rather for relaxing them.
The remedy suggested by the study was the creation, with government financing but by private action, of a new agency that would designate nonaccredited schools or programs as nevertheless satisfactory for
federal program purposes, and would maximize consumer information
by rating schools. In effect, the study argues for a new, catchall accrediting agency unfettered by direct disciplinary, professional or institutional control.
Although the authors termed the proposal a "modest measure," it
is anything but that, for it contemplates nothing less than a single, allencompassing alternative accrediting agency to deal with every program and institution that has chosen to eschew resort to the existing
programmatic or institutional agency; as in direct accreditation by a
federal agency, the task is Herculean. Further, there is no assurance
that any agency so constituted and funded would, over time, do a
significantly different or better job than existing agencies; in fact, the
organization's dependence upon federal financial support might make
it more amenable to external political influence than existing agencies.
An alternative approach to the problem of wrongful accreditation
is a variation upon the proposed appellate function of the government
in instances of wrongful refusal to accredit. Congress could create in
that same agency the power to determine, after notice and hearing
upon a record, that an accredited institution or program fals sufficiently afoul of the standards of its accrediting agency that it ought to
be declared ineligible for program participation despite the accrediting
agency's declination to proceed against the institution. The power to
85. H. Orlans, supra note 2, at 570-71.
86. Id. at 571.
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initiate such an ineligibility proceeding would rest with an independent, prosecutorial branch within the agency. It would have discretion
to act, after investigation, either upon a complaint that raised a question of significant noncompliance with accrediting standards, or sua
sponte. Unlike a refusal to accredit, a wrongful accreditation does not
automatically produce a party directly aggrieved by the action. For
this reason, the prosecutorial branch should be given the power to act
in the absence of a complaint. Nevertheless, student, faculty or other
groups may properly raise a question of serious institutional departures
from accepted norms. It would be expected that such complaints
would first be referred for the consideration of the relevant accrediting
agency, if it had not previously considered the matter. Similarly, the
preliminary findings of an investigation would be brought to the
agency's attention before commencing a proceeding to contest
eligibility.
The benefits of this approach are several. The standards against
which the institution or program would be measured would not be established by the government, but would be set by a private agency that
has been determined to be a generally reliable authority in the academic or professional community. The initial application of these
standards to the institution or program would also be privately determined; as in cases of wrongful refusal to accredit, the agency's determinations would be accorded presumptive soundness. In addition, the
prospect of initiation of governmental action should be expected to
serve as a goad to greater attentiveness by accrediting agencies to the
policing of their standards, and so to greater consistency in the application of their standards. It suffices to observe that a series of adjudications determining that a particular agency has been extraordinarily lax
in the application of its standards should provide sufficient grounds for
delisting the agency.
This proposal does have the disadvantage of adding to government regulation of education and to the current environment of "creeping legalism." To the extent the lack of adequate policing of
educational quality by established accrediting agencies has lead to educationally substandard schools or programs receiving federal support,
however, some corrective action is required. The instant proposal narrowly circumscribes the federal role, both substantively and procedurally; it would rely upon the standard-setting function of recognized
private agencies and would separate eligibility from accreditation on
the basis of an adjudication.
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Moreover, as Robert M. O'Neil has recently pointed out, ingenious (or desperate) counsel have commenced lawsuits against institutions based upon the failure to provide basic quality in education; these
suits have not been dismissed out of hand as presenting nonjusticiable
claims.8 7 As a consequence, the educational value of an institution's
programs may be subject to sporadic scrutiny by the courts at the behest of disgruntled students. The additional external intrusion into the
affairs of institutions and accrediting agencies required by the proposed
legislation would not, in fact, differ substantially from what an accrediting agency currently confronts in a suit for a refusal to accredit or a
disaccreditation, or from what an institution currently confronts in a
suit by students for failing to provide an education of satisfactory
quality.
The more serious difficulty with this proposal lies in the power of
branch to commence an ineligibility proceeding. The
prosecutorial
the
impact of the initiation of a proceeding upon the reputation of the institution or program, with its likely effects upon enrollment, faculty retention, or even institutional survival, would give considerable bargaining
power to the prosecutor to decline action in return for concessions that
arguably might not relate to any significant departure from accreditation standards. The institution might have no realistic alternative to
such a "plea bargain" but to accede. To be sure, this is not a new issue
in administrative law; but, a check upon the exercise of prosecutorial
discretion would be found in the accreditation-reliance system itself.
Although the prosecutorial branch would be structurally separate from
the agency, its function must be seen as part of the larger, cooperative
system of federal reliance upon private determinations. To the extent
an accrediting agency has done its job-has thoroughly reviewed the
problems brought to its attention and has either found them insufficient
to raise a significant question of continued accreditation or worked out
a resolution with the institution-the likelihood of an abuse of
prosecutorial discretion would be minimized. Consequently, the proposal's most significant impact lies not in the likelihood of actually
87. Address by Robert M. O'Neil, First Annual Conference on Legal Problems of Independent Higher Education, University of Notre Dame (Oct. 18, 1978) (copy on file in office of North
CarolinaLaw Review). He observed:
What we are likely to see in this country, as has already occurred in some European
countries, is an increasingly resourceful adaptation and evolution of legal theories toward the protection of student interests. I do not decry this development, nor do I applaud it; rather, it seems to me simply an inescapable consequence of the growing
accountability of all institutions, including those which provide higher education.
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commencing such proceedings but in the implications the mere availability of such a procedure would have for assuring consistent policing
of their standards by accrediting agencies themselves.
IV.

CONCLUSION

This discussion seems to have come full circle. It started out by
arguing that the Office of Education lacks the authority to regulate at
least some of the internal affairs of listed accrediting agencies; it concludes that, to the extent the government sees educational quality as a
real concern in the management of the billions spent in aid of education, more regulation is required. But there is a difference both practically and institutionally. The instant proposal accepts the basic
premises of the current system; reform is directed exclusively to the
perceived deficiencies of accrediting agencies as reliable determinants
of educational quality. The Commissioner's criteria at issue here
largely ignore the serious criticism leveled at accreditation; instead, the
Commissioner has attempted to require accrediting agencies to assume
a regulatory function over issues they are neither interested in nor competent to handle. As the foregoing has evidenced, much of what the
Commissioner has done is inconsistent with the premises of the statutory system.
From an institutional perspective, it is irrelevant whether the instant proposal is accepted or, for that matter, whether the problem of
educational quality is of such a dimension as to warrant any change in
the current system. That determination, as well as the fashioning of a
suitable corrective, is for the Congress, not the Commissioner of Education. This is not because the legislature is inherently wiser than the
Office of Education in its understanding of the educational system. It
can be persuasively argued, for example, that because regional accreditation does not attest to the educational quality of any one program, the
congressional confrontation with nurse training produced a result that
makes no educational sense. The question is one for Congress, not because the legislature is educationally competent, but because it is institutionally competent. How the government is to be assured of
educational quality raises fundamental questions of social policy implicating a delicate balancing of public power and institutional autonomy;
the wise expenditure of public funds and the sound administration of
federal programs, on the one hand, and, on the other, the freedom of
institutions to teach, research and grope for knowledge unfettered by
the regulatory power of the state. At least initially, such "controverted
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issues of public policy are properly decided, as nearly as effective political and institutional arrangements will permit, in forums closest to the
sources of popular representation." '

88. Freedman, supra note 55, at 317-18 (footnote omitted).

